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Abstract
This paper reviews corporate finance literature which explains some of the
long-term causes of the Japanese banking sector’s poor performance in the early
1990s. It concentrates on the ideas that an adverse selection problem developed in
the bank lending market during the 1980s, and that banks had strong incentives to
seek out borrowers which were of lower quality and which had greater exposure to
adverse movements in asset prices. Possible links between these hypotheses and
the macroeconomic environment are also considered.
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At the start of the 1990s, Japanese banks were held in reasonably high regard.
There was a consensus in industrial organisation theory that they selected and
monitored their industrial clients efficiently and that they met the need for
corporate governance in a way that the takeover market could not. For this reason,
it was widely believed that financial intermediation was one source of the
productivity growth that had fuelled Japan’s postwar economic expansion
(Calder 1993).
By the end of the decade, those impressions had dissipated. Growth had stagnated,
and in ways that reflect badly on the banks. By disrupting financial intermediation,
the non-performing loans of Japanese banks have constrained investment for the
better part of a decade. In 1998, they were equal to roughly 25 per cent of GDP
(Lincoln 1998), and at the end of March 1999, they still constituted 12 per cent of
outstanding credit exposure (OECD 1999, p 87).
Some of the longer-term causes of those problems lie in the deterioration of banks’
loan portfolios which occurred during the 1980s. Over this period, banks
developed large exposures to borrowers who were either very vulnerable to falling
asset prices or were, for other reasons, not very creditworthy. Not only did banks
accept substantial credit risk by targeting these borrowers, they apparently
attenuated their monitoring and screening of them.
This paper surveys some of the literature which explains the deterioration in the
quality of the banks’ loan portfolios. It focuses on two hypotheses that have
emerged in the corporate finance literature. The first is that capital market reform
over the 1980s encouraged high-quality borrowers to secure disintermediated
forms of finance, with the result that an adverse selection problem developed in the
Japanese bank lending market. The second is that the simultaneous deregulation of2
the wholesale funds and retail lending markets compressed the margins of banks.
Given the various safety nets in operation in Japan at the time, it was rational of the
banks to respond to the reduction in their franchise values by targeting borrowers
which presented greater risks but offered higher nominal rates of return. Much of
the accumulated exposure of banks to firms which were vulnerable to the asset
price collapse of the early 1990s can be understood in terms of these two ideas.
Macroeconomic developments inform both arguments. During the 1970s,
economic growth began to slow. This required financial reform, which in turn,
eventually caused some dislocation of the domestic banking system. The problems
worsened in the late 1980s, as monetary policy was eased in response to falling
consumer price inflation and an appreciating nominal exchange rate. This
substantially eroded the franchise values of banking.
The next section presents a stylised overview of Japan’s corporate finance markets
prior to the 1980s. Section 3 profiles the subsequent deregulation of the system,
and it reviews some of the theories which relate the changes in the corporate
finance market to the changes in bank behaviour. The final section summarises the
analysis.
2.  Historical Background
Private domestic banks have intermediated a high proportion of Japanese corporate
finance throughout most of the postwar period. Data reported by Hamada and
Horiuchi (1987) indicate that, on average, their loans accounted for about
three-quarters of all externally sourced industrial funds between 1947 and 1972.
Table 1 shows that they also managed, and continue to manage, a high proportion
of household savings.3
Table 1: Composition of Personal Savings
Per cent of total
Deposits and savings Trusts Bonds Insurance Other
Banks Post offices Other
1977 28.7 17.9 21.4 5.9 9.6 14.6 1.9
1980 27.1 20.1 20.3 5.4 9.4 15.9 1.8
1985 25.8 21.5 21.7 5.5 9.3 15.3 0.9
1990 26.0 18.0 17.8 5.3 6.8 20.7 5.4
1995 24.3 21.9 16.7 4.6 4.0 24.8 3.7
Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various issues)
Note: ‘Other’ deposits and savings are held at shinkin banks, credit co-operatives, agricultural and fishery
co-operatives, and labor credit associations.
The importance of the banking system in Japanese industrial finance dates back at
least to the early postwar period, when household financial wealth was low, and
the diversification of risk through the stock market was prohibitively expensive.
The attractions of financial intermediation in such an environment were enhanced
by the (then) acute problems of maturity transformation and the need for a viable
system of corporate governance (Hamada and Horiuchi 1987; Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein 1993).
Financial regulation validated banks as a solution to these problems and promoted
their role in both corporate finance and governance. It limited entry to the banking
market, and it effectively restricted securities market access to long-term credit
banks, public utilities, and a handful of manufacturers. Through a comprehensive
web of regulations and through the tax structure, it also discouraged reliance on
equity finance. And finally, it preserved the pre-war philosophy of financial market
segmentation. Among other things, regulation partitioned rural and urban banking,
commercial and trust banking, long-term and short-term financing, and it separated
the various types of securities business from other forms of finance.
From the mid-1970s, aspects of this structure began to change (Table 2). Initially,
borrowed capital gave way to internally generated funding as a major source of
finance among larger firms. Then, during the 1980s, the declining dependence of
major corporations on bank loans accelerated, as the deregulation of securities
markets facilitated bond finance.4
Table 2: Funding of Principal Industrial Enterprises
Per cent of total supply of funds
Period average Own capital Net trade credit Debt
Borrowing Bonds
1969–1973 41.3 6.0 47.3 5.4
1974–1978 53.3 5.1 31.8 9.8
1979–1983 57.5 4.6 30.3 7.6
1984–1988 76.6 –0.1  8.7 16.1
1989–1993 83.8 0.1  4.3 11.8
Source: Adapted from Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various issues)
Notes: The criteria for inclusion in the survey have varied over time. Firms currently in the sample have a market
capitalisation greater than ¥1 billion. Their number rose over the sample period from 484 in 1969 to 651 in
1993.
Patrick (1999) argues that these changes in the corporate finance environment were
closely related to several macroeconomic developments that date from the 1970s.
The first of these was a slowing rate of real economic growth (Figure 1). By the
early 1970s, domestic investment opportunities had become somewhat scarcer,
causing the retained earnings of larger corporations to rise and their financial
deficits to fall (Table 2). This represented a significant threat to the market share
and operating income of the banking sector, which depended heavily on interest
income from loans to non-financial corporations. Banks regarded the liberalisation
of their lending markets as a means of restoring their competitiveness and
reasserting their market share of the total flow of funds (Cargill and
Royama 1992).
Concurrent with the slowing growth rate was a steady increase in the current
account surplus. When growth fell and investment declined, the current account
surplus rose (Figure 1). As Argy (1987) points out, the implied capital outflows
had to be accommodated with a more flexible capital account structure. This was
particularly pressing for banks and larger non-financial corporations, both of which
were managing larger flows of foreign exchange. As explained in more detail
below, this provided the impetus for the relaxation of some capital controls, and it
paved the way for deregulation of the domestic securities markets.5
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The other important macroeconomic development of the 1970s was the sharp
increase in public sector indebtedness. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
Japanese government increased public works expenditure significantly. Shortly
afterwards, non-discretionary expenditure also increased, as Japan encountered
what was then its most serious postwar recession. The combined effect of these
processes was a large increase in public sector debt. The deficit of the total public
sector increased from one per cent of GDP in 1970 to 7.3 per cent in 1975. The
Bank of Japan monetised little of the debt, and so private sector bond holdings
increased substantially.
At this time, government bonds were effectively allocated to a syndicate of banks
on terms that were set by the Ministry of Finance. The increase in their issuance,
coupled with a rise in inflation, squeezed banks’ real margins and led to lobbying
for the development of more effective secondary markets: a demand to which the
government acquiesced. Before 1977, fewer than five per cent of national bonds
were sold on the Tokyo secondary market; by 1982, that ratio had risen to
62 per cent (Hamada and Horiuchi 1987, p 28).6
The liberalisation of the government bond market proved contagious, forcing the
creation of a market in negotiable certificates of deposit in 1979 and the eventual
liberalisation of the money markets. Partial liberalisation of government bond
trading in 1977 had caused a marked increase in the size of the gensaki market for
short-term repurchase agreements in government bonds, and this produced a
significant change in the wholesale funds market. Faced with a loss of market
share, banks lobbied (again successfully) for the progressive liberalisation of
alternative money market and deposit instruments.
And so, by the late 1970s, Japan’s autarkic and regulated corporate financial
system had come under considerable pressure from some lasting and significant
macroeconomic changes. By the end of the decade, the banks – whose interests the
system had been designed to protect – were pressing for reform.
3.  Developments in the 1980s
By the mid-1980s, financial reform was proceeding on several fronts. Interest rates
were being more competitively determined, and markets in foreign exchange,
government bonds and other securities were at various stages of deregulation.
These changes in the corporate finance environment would eventually lead to some
distancing of banks and high quality borrowers, and that would in turn eventually
force the banks to lend to firms which were to become primary sources of the
non-performing loans problem several years later. We begin by considering these
developments from the perspective of major non-financial corporations.
3.1  Non-financial Corporations
As a result of the securitisation process and the greater accessibility of internally
generated funds, banks lost many of their better clients and were forced to price
loans more competitively for a high proportion of the remainder. Consider the
process of securitisation first. This gathered speed from 1980, and by 1994, the
largest Japanese firms were undertaking up to 80 per cent of their borrowing
directly in local and offshore markets (OECD 1996, p 177).7
Much of the issuance took place offshore, since the 1980 reform of the Foreign
Exchange and Trade Control Law had dramatically facilitated securitised
borrowing in foreign markets. It was cheaper, administratively easier, and subject
to more permissive eligibility and collateral requirements than domestic issuance.
It was also a cost effective means of meeting the growing appetite of Japanese
investors for equity (see below), since transactions involving convertible and
warrant bonds attracted lower tax than those involving equity issued in the
domestic market.1 As a result, offshore issuance by Japanese resident corporations
increased by a factor of 16 between 1980 and 1989, while new issuance in the
domestic market increased by a factor of only five (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Domestic and Foreign Bond Issuance
















Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various issues)
One effect of the deregulation of offshore markets was to accelerate the
liberalisation of domestic markets. In order to compete with the newly liberalised
foreign markets, the banking cartel which controlled domestic bond issues relaxed
                                          
1  Warrant and convertible bonds confer on the purchaser of the bond an entitlement to stocks in
the firm under pre-specified conditions. They are effectively two closely related types of
long-term call option.8
both its fee structure and its collateral requirements throughout the decade.
Between 1979 and 1989, collateral requirements on unsecured domestic straight
and convertible debt were eased to the extent that the number of companies eligible
to issue unsecured straight bonds rose from 2 to 300, while the number eligible to
issue unsecured convertible debt rose from 2 to 500.
Much of the securitisation that took place in both foreign and domestic markets
was equity-related (Figure 3). In fact, as Figure 4 shows, equity-related debt
displaced direct equity placements as a source of securitisation fairly early in the
decade, and in 1989, firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange raised more
finance through foreign issues of warrant bonds than they did through direct equity
raisings.
Figure 3: Composition of Total New Bond Issues























Source: Bank of Japan, Economics Statistics Annual (various issues)9
Figure 4: Funds Raised Through the Issuance of Securities















Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various issues)
Of itself, securitisation would not necessarily have implied a great decrease in
firms’ dependence on banks for funding. Early in the postwar period, banks were
compelled to hold most of the bonds that were issued by the corporate sector and
so the substitution of bank debt for securitised borrowing by non-financial
corporations did not threaten the market share of banks in lending markets
(Figure 5). However, this policy was gradually relaxed, and so when securitisation
began in earnest, bond issuing non-financial firms became much less dependent on
banks for their financing needs.
Rising levels of retained earnings were another means by which larger and better
non-financial corporations were able to distance themselves from their banks. After
several decades of consistent postwar growth, Japan’s major corporations had
developed large stocks of internal funds from which to finance their investments.
Although, as Table 2 shows, this was obvious in the case of large firms, it seems to
have been true of the corporate sector more broadly. The Economic Planning
Agency (1992) reports that retained earnings as a proportion of total funding10
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increased from an average of 39.4 per cent in 1962–1964 to 52.3 per cent in the
interval 1985–1989. A similar trend is reflected in the ratio of corporate financial
assets to liabilities. For principal (non-financial) enterprises, this climbed from
51 per cent to about 80 per cent between 1972 and 1989. Indeed, for large scale
manufacturers, the ratio had moved above one by 1988, and it climbed as high as
1.9 for two of the largest manufacturing enterprises (Bank of Japan 1991c).
Of the two comparatively new sources of corporate funding, retained earnings is
the easier to understand, since internally generated earnings are usually a firm’s
cheapest source of finance. By contrast, the rising ratio of securitised finance to
bank debt is more puzzling. In the early 1990s, much extant theory and evidence
suggested that bank finance in Japan, more than elsewhere, minimised the agency
cost of finance. The long-term relationship banking that had been a hallmark of
financing patterns was thought to be a particularly effective means of dissolving
informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders (Hodder 1991; Hodder
and Tschoegl 1985; Prowse 1992 and Lichtenberg and Pushner 1994). Partly
because of this, it was also widely believed that bank finance relaxed a firm’s11
liquidity constraints (Hoshi et al 1991; Gerlach 1992). In the light of those
findings, the growing preference of large firms for securitised finance over bank
debt was something of a puzzle.
Drawing on earlier work by Caves and Uekusa (1976), Weinstein and
Yafeh  (1998) develop a possible solution. They argue that, contrary to
appearances, Japan’s pre-deregulation system of finance raised, rather than
lowered, the agency costs of debt, and that non-financial firms only maintained
close relations with banks in order to overcome credit rationing problems.2 Their
model emphasises that banks are able to control the behaviour of their borrowers,
since they usually have equity positions in those firms.3 Because they are typically
more exposed to firms as creditors than as shareholders, banks will raise the capital
intensity (and leverage) of their client firms beyond levels consistent with profit
maximisation.4 Non-bank shareholders may prefer lower leverage and capital
intensive production but, in a credit-rationed system, they will be able to assert that
preference only when non-bank forms of credit are accessible. In support of this
argument, Weinstein and Yafeh present evidence to suggest that the capital costs of
firms which have a heavy dependence on bank debt declined more substantially
than the costs of other firms after capital market liberalisation.
An alternative perspective on securitisation is that the agency problems which
motivated a dependence on bank debt in the early postwar years had eased by the
1980s. In somewhat unorthodox fashion, Diamond (1991) has argued that
disintermediated debt should be most profitable for firms which have sound
reputations. This is mainly because the holders of securitised debt do not monitor
their investments. They may therefore charge a lower rental price of capital than
banks, but they will make funds available only to well collateralised and highly
profitable borrowers. Such borrowers would have been scarce in Japan shortly
after the Pacific War (Hamada and Horiuchi 1987), but they would certainly have
been abundant after several decades of rapid growth. Disintermediated debt would
                                          
2  Frankel (1991) makes a similar point.
3  Two points are pertinent here. First, Japanese corporate law allows banks to be both creditors
and shareholders of their clients, subject to certain limits. Second, there is a very large
literature which affirms that Japanese banks do indeed strongly influence the affairs of their
client firms. See, for example, the contributions in Aoki et al (1994).
4  A similar point is made by Aoki (1984).12
therefore have become prevalent, regardless of the degree of competition in the
bank lending market.
Several empirical studies have confirmed the importance of borrower
characteristics as factors driving securitisation in Japan. For example, Hoshi et al
(1993) adapt Diamond’s model to explore a non-financial firm’s choice between
intermediated and securitised debt, and they show that more profitable and better
collateralised firms will tend to prefer the latter.
Anderson and Makhija (1999) have recently reported similar results, although their
analysis places greater emphasis on the relationship between a firm’s growth
prospects and its capital structure. Following Myers (1977), Anderson and Makhija
reason that firms with high growth potential depend on managerial discretion for
the realisation of their value. For these firms, (monitored) bank debt is cheaper
because corporate bond holders – who lack the technology for monitoring their
investments – are very exposed to the risk of managerial delinquency. In contrast,
firms with low growth prospects and large stocks of existing physical assets have
substantial collateral, and so their bond holders are well insured against delinquent
management. For these firms, disintermediated debt may well be cheaper because
it does not attract a monitoring premium. Securitised debt should therefore be more
prevalent among well collateralised, and slowly growing, firms. Anderson and
Makhija find this to be the case in Japan.
Another factor which may have encouraged securitisation is the monetary ease of
the latter 1980s. In response to sharp yen appreciation and subdued consumer price
inflation, monetary policy was eased from early 1986, and in February 1987, the
official discount rate reached what was then an historical low of 2.5 per cent
(Figure 6). It held this level until mid-1989, by which time consumer price
inflation had begun to rise.13
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The lower interest rates could have contributed to the changed financing patterns in
several ways. First, they could have mitigated the agency problems associated with
disintermediated debt. Diamond (1991) makes the somewhat unorthodox point that
direct finance will become more prevalent as real interest rates fall. This is because
a fall in real interest rates lowers a manager’s discount rate and increases the
present value of his\her reputation. Consequently, managers become more
trustworthy at low levels of real interest rates, and the agency problems that inhibit
disintermediated debt become less severe. As a result, a higher proportion of good
firms would have been in a position to securitise their debt once the general level
of interest rates began to fall.
A second channel through which monetary ease may have fuelled securitisation is
through stock prices. Japanese stock prices rose sharply over the late 1980s,
possibly because of a contemporaneous rise in the value of land held by
corporations (Figure 7). But whatever its cause, the rise in share prices, coupled
with expectations of further increases, greatly reduced the costs of issuing debt that
was equity-related.14































Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various issues)
Notes: The land price is a year-end observation of the land price index for Japan’s six largest cities; 1990 = 100.
Besides being cheap, equity-related debt may have satisfied certain narrow
managerial interests in borrowing firms. Horiuchi (1994) reasons that many
Japanese managers preferred the newly accessible equity-related debt instruments
because they generated more free cash flow for the consumption of managerial
perquisites. As asset prices rose, the securitisation of debt became more attractive,
not only because it was cheaper, but because it conferred greater autonomy on the
managers of non-financial firms.5
Yet another theory emphasises the corporate groups (keiretsu) for which Japan has
become renowned. Many models of Japanese corporate behaviour downplay the
importance of one-to-one relations between a firm and its bank in the
determination of bank loan pricing and capital structure. Instead they emphasise
the implicit relationships among non-financial firms as determinants of corporate
capital structure. In some of the more mainstream theories dealing with these
                                          
5  See also Bank of Japan (1993b, p 3).15
relationships, there are clear reasons for which firms might securitise their debt
once given the opportunity to do so.
Nakatani’s (1984) model is a case in point. Nakatani defines membership of a
keiretsu partly by a degree of dependence on shared group financial institutions. In
this  ‘hub and spokes’ conception of the relationship between banks and their
borrowers, corporate governance is the outcome of a risk sharing process, to which
the more conventional agency arrangement connecting banks, borrowers and
depositors is subordinate. Each firm in the group borrows a high proportion of its
funds from group financial institutions, paying a premium on its borrowing in
normal states, in the expectation of support from the group financial institutions in
the event of financial distress. When membership of the group is diverse and when
opportunities for finance outside it are scarce, the mechanism operates like an
insurance network. Evidence that group-affiliated firms exhibit lower but more
stable profitability than independent firms is often interpreted as evidence in favour
of this hypothesis.
Implicit in Ramseyer’s (1994) critique of this framework are several reasons for
which it would not operate in deregulated capital markets. In particular, if each
firm in a group has private information about its own prospects, then access to
non-group finance will destabilise the network. Better firms will securitise their
debt, since the premium they are charged on their group borrowing is actuarially
unfair. The most plausible outcome is a separating equilibrium in which
group-based risk sharing only takes place among those firms whose public
reputations are too poor to allow securitisation. In this case, self-selection by
borrowers leads to a deterioration in the average quality of bank borrowers,
independently of the banks’ own monitoring and screening efforts. Once again, this
is broadly consistent with the evidence of Hoshi et al (1993) and of Anderson and
Makhija (1999).
To summarise, many non-financial firms accepted new opportunities for reducing
their dependence on bank debt during the 1980s. For a number of reasons, the
incentives were strongest among high quality firms. Firms of lower
creditworthiness were forced to maintain a relatively greater dependence on bank
finance, and so banks became increasingly subject to an adverse selection problem
in their lending markets.16
3.2  The Banking Environment
The change in the borrowing patterns of large corporations coincided with a
number of changes in the banking environment over the 1980s. Generally
speaking, the most important of these was the compression of banks’ lending
margins. This reduced the franchise value of banking and inspired the redirection
of lending to firms with which the banks were unfamiliar and which represented
greater credit risk.
Somewhat surprisingly, the profitability of the Japanese banking industry actually
improved over the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1987, the rate of return on equity
briefly reversed its long-term downward trend and increased significantly.
However, the higher profits do not suggest that the banks were any more profitable
in their lending markets. They were achieved through low rates of capital growth
and relative declines in expenditure, rather than through rising interest income.
Indeed, between 1979 and 1990, declining net interest income worked to suppress
the rate of return on equity. (Bank of Japan 1993a, p 28; Figure 8).
A key cause of the contraction in net interest income was the deregulation of the
wholesale funds market. This began in 1979 when banks were authorised to issue
negotiable certificates of deposits at market rates of return.6 It continued until 1994
and was at its most rapid after 1985, when the deregulation of interest rates on time
deposits began. In the following five years, the proportion of time deposits which
attracted unregulated rates of interest rose from just 4.3 per cent to 74 per cent
(Bank of Japan 1991a, p 73) and the overall proportion of total funds raised at
market rates of interest rose from 22 per cent to over 70 per cent (Nakajima and
Taguchi 1995, p 58).
An important property of the deregulated instruments was that their rates of return
generally exceeded those on regulated instruments with similar risk and maturity
profiles. The deregulation of the wholesale funds market and the shift to market
determined deposit costs therefore produced a rise in the overall cost of wholesale
funds. Furthermore, the difference between the regulated and unregulated rates of
                                          
6  See Hall (1998, pp 82–88) or Takeda and Turner (1992) for a chronology and a more detailed
discussion of the process.17
Figure 8: Interest Related Income Relative to Gross Income
and Bank Capital
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Source: OECD, Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of Banks (various issues)
Note: Commercial banks are those reporting to the Federation of Bankers’ Associations of Japan.
interest became more pronounced over time. For example, the spread between
banks’ average cost of funds and the then regulated three-month time deposit rate
increased from about 0.1 per cent in 1985 to 1.75 per cent in 1991 (Bank of
Japan 1991a, p 31).
The accelerated easing of monetary policy after early 1986 failed to offset fully the
effects of the rising funding costs on bank profits. The Economic Planning
Agency (1993) has found that the stimulatory effects of accommodating monetary
policy on bank lending margins were much more subdued in the late 1980s than in
previous phases of monetary ease.
Underlying the comparatively high rate of pass-through of falling wholesale
funding costs was the greater contestability of the corporate finance market. Banks
were not only competing with the more liberal securities markets, they were also
competing much more aggressively with one another. Before the 1980s, firms18
commonly maintained close relationships with a particular bank (or syndicate of
banks) in order to secure a stable line of credit. Effective lending rates were held
reasonably stable over the business cycle, and this was interpreted by observers,
either as a sign of inter-temporal risk sharing between banks and their borrowers
(Osano and Tsutsui 1985), or as a means by which banks could maximise the
effectiveness of their screening and monitoring of their borrowers over the long
term (Horiuchi, Packer and Fukada 1988). But whatever the case, the arrangement
began to unravel over the late 1980s. Firms became more inclined to sever ties
with their main bank in the interests of ‘shopping around’ for bank debt (Economic
Planning Agency 1993; Bank of Japan 1991a). The result was more competitive
bank loan pricing.
This is clearly visible in the effective lending rates of interest on bank debt faced
by small and medium sized enterprises. When financial markets were tightly
regulated, effective lending rates were well above their face, or notional, values.
Face lending rates were determined by a markup over controlled deposit rates and
they were usually below market-clearing levels. To clear markets and maximise
profits, banks typically required that borrowers withdraw more than they actually
needed, and re-deposit their surplus borrowing with the bank. This redeposit is
known as a compensating balance, or derivative deposit. It inflates the cost of
capital to final borrowers by an amount equal to the spread of lending over deposit
rates, multiplied by the size of the compensating balance. Equation (1) expresses








where: re = effective lending rate; d = deposit rate of interest; rl = face lending rate
of interest; β = proportion of a loan in the form of compensating balances.
Although nominal and effective lending rates of interest had been converging prior
to financial deregulation, they fell to historic lows during the 1980s, as increasing
competition in retail lending markets drove down the ratio of compensating
balances to total loans (Figure 9). The decline in the profitability of lending
reported in Figure 8 was a direct consequence of this.19
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Source: Japan Fair Trade Commission, Research on Derivative Deposits (various issues)
Note: Data are derived from a survey of small to medium sized enterprises.
Figure 10 shows that the decline in effective lending margins recovered and then
stabilised in 1987. The Bank of Japan (1993a, p 13) associated this with a
redirection of bank credit into new and more lucrative sectors of the economy.
Particularly prominent among these new sectors was the real estate industry.
Between 1985 and 1992, real estate related lending grew at an average annual rate
of 13.7 per cent. This compares with an increase in overall bank lending of around
6.6 per cent over the same period (Nakajima and Taguchi 1995, p 59; Figure 11).20
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Source: Japan Fair Trade Commission, Research on Derivative Deposits (various issues)
Note: The long-term prime rate is the notional lending rate.
Real estate lending was clearly associated with banks’ attempts to maintain
franchise values in the face of falling margins and contracting client bases.
Ueda  (1999) for instance, observes that real estate lending increased most
markedly among those banks whose client base of small firms was
under-developed and among banks with more expensive deposit liabilities.
One reason why this lending seemed profitable is that it is subject to long-term
lending rates of interest. During the latter 1980s, when monetary policy was being
eased, the spread between these rates and short-term funding costs increased. As a
result, between 1986 and 1990, the ratio of long-term, to total outstanding, loans
increased from 42 per cent to 56 per cent. Among city banks, which have the
largest share of deposit liabilities, the increase was from 37 to 57 per cent. Much of
this was reportedly associated with real estate.21
Figure 11: Growth of All Banks’ Assets

























Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, various issues
A second attraction of real estate related lending was that many of those who either
wished to borrow against, or purchase, real estate were small, and therefore
ineligible to securitise their finance (Figure 12). Even after relaxation of collateral
and other eligibility requirements for direct debt issuance, small businesses were
still more likely to depend on intermediated finance than larger firms, and the
banks continued to enjoy a greater degree of market power when loan pricing in
the small business sector.
A final attraction of real estate related lending was that it appeared safe.
Coinciding with the rate of increase in land price inflation was a sharp decline in
the rate of bankruptcies in the real estate sector as a whole (Bank of Japan, 1991a).22
Figure 12: Outstanding Loans to Large and Small Firms















Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various issues)
Notes: Large manufacturing firms have more than 300 regular employees and more than ¥100 million in
equity. Retailers and wholesalers are subject to different classification criteria.
The increase in real estate lending occurred through several channels (Table 3).
The first was a direct increase in banks’ lending to firms involved in real estate
related transactions. But since the Ministry of Finance came to take a dim view of
this lending, banks also channelled funds to the sector through the agency of
finance and insurance related businesses. Third, banks’ increased lending to
individuals and households also reflected a greater exposure to real estate, since
much of it was secured with property.23
Table 3: All Banks’ Loans and Discounts by Purpose
Percentage of total outstanding
1983 1987 1990







– Finance and insurance
– Other non-manufacturing 45.7 44.1 43.7
Individuals 9.9 11.3 16.3
Other 3.2  3.8 3.0
Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various issues)
Notes: Discounts include commercial bills, bankers’ acceptances and exchange bills.
Because the banking industry was still quite segmented during the 1980s, these
compositional changes in lending varied across the banking sector. The large
non-financial firms which were most actively securitising their finance, or funding
themselves out of retained earnings, had previously been the clients of city banks
or long-term credit banks.7 Consequently, it was the city banks and long-term
credit banks which were most actively restructuring their loan portfolios. By
contrast, regional banks have franchises to service particular geographic markets.
On average, they lend much less to the large manufacturing companies that were
securitising their finance in the latter 1980s, and so they experienced less pressure
on their margins and less disruption to their client base. For that reason, the
growing tendency of banks to develop exposures in the real estate sector was more
pronounced among the city and long-term credit banks than among the regional
banks (Bank of Japan 1991a, p 40).8
                                          
7  City banks are essentially commercial banks with a nationwide presence.
8  This is true only of the first tier regional banks, and even then it is subject to some exceptions.
Smaller, second tier regional banks diverted a high proportion of their lending into higher risk
sectors and they have, in consequence, fared worse than larger regional banks in the 1990s
(East Asia Analytical Unit 1996).24
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Despite its attractions, the redirection of bank credit into real estate brought with it
considerable risks, especially default risk. There were several reasons for this.
First, and most obviously, there was the question of the value of collateral. Banks’
borrowers (and therefore the banks themselves) were, on average, much more
exposed to downside risk in the property market than previously. Furthermore,
loan-to-valuation ratios tended to be much higher in the late 1980s than had
traditionally been the case. Property price inflation therefore produced an
overvaluation of land held as collateral. As this inflation reached a peak in the late
1980s, both of these latent problems became acute.
A second sense in which credit risk increased as a result of real estate-related
lending involves the characteristics of the non-banks in the real estate sector. First,
many were beyond the proper scope of prudential regulation.9 Second, and as
previously noted, many were small (Figure 12). If, as seems reasonable, there are
economies of scale in the monitoring of borrowers, then the shifting emphasis
toward smaller borrowers would have made the task of monitoring loans much
more difficult. Both Horiuchi (1994) and the Bank of Japan (1991b, 1993a) have
identified this as a problem.
A further problem with real estate lending was its association with a sharp increase
in overdraft lending. Individuals and firms were increasingly able to obtain
overdraft credit secured against real estate, and the ratio of city banks’ overdrafts
to total outstanding loans rose from 1.9 per cent at the end of 1980 to 17.6 per cent
at the end of 1990. The Bank of Japan (1991b) has pointed out that this type of
credit was less effectively screened and monitored than most other forms of
lending.
Finally, the long-term nature of much property lending seems to have undermined
the control of banks over their borrowers. As a general rule, banks are more able to
set limits on the conduct of their borrowers when they have the option not to roll
                                          
9  The seven home mortgage companies (jusen) that became insolvent in 1995 are the most
famous example.26
over maturing debt. To the extent that the real estate lending which took place in
the late 1980s was long-term, they surrendered this authority.10
The increase in banks’ exposure to real estate-related enterprises was only one
reflection of the deterioration in the average quality of bank loans over the 1980s.
Others included a reduced attention to the value of non-real estate-related
collateral. In particular, the proportion of bank loans unsecured by collateral
increased by roughly 10 percentage points between 1980 and 1985. Although that
trend abated later in the decade, the proportion of unsecured loans in 1989 was still
approximately 4 percentage points above its 1980 level.
A second indicator that banks were becoming lax was their growing tendency to
subordinate the work of their credit assessment and monitoring departments to the
work of their loans promotions sections (Bank of Japan 1991b). In response to
falling effective margins and rising deposit liabilities, banks began to pay more
attention to loans promotion. Despite the weakening demand for bank loans from
large business, growth in lending explained a large and stable proportion of the
growth in overall assets. At times during the mid 1980s, it accounted for up to
70 per cent of overall asset accumulation (Figure 11).
This provides reasonably clear evidence of the appetite of banks for riskier lending.
As Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) observe, when confronted with a decline in loan
demand from quality borrowers, banks could have maintained asset quality by
substituting out of lending and into bonds.11 But they did not do so. Corporate
bonds as a proportion of total bank assets remained fairly constant over the 1980s,
and the proportion of outstanding government debt held by banks actually declined
(Figure 14). This tends to suggest a preference for lending in unfamiliar markets
over holding higher quality, if lower yielding, securitised debt.
                                          
10 This is to say nothing of the fact that banks had increased their exposure to simple interest rate
risk by extending the duration of their loan portfolios and continuing to borrow short-term.
11 The main impediment to increasing the weighting of corporate bonds in total assets was the
fact that many of those bonds were equity-related, and restrictions apply to banks’ holdings of
equity.27
Figure 14: Proportion of Government Debt Held by Private Banks
















Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various issues)
The strong emphasis on the promotion of lending compromised the screening of
loans applications and, as a result, the average quality of borrowers fell (Bank of
Japan 1991c). A related problem was that banks’ internal management and control
systems were weakened over the period (Ministry of Finance 1993, p  40).
Particularly common were failures of banks to maintain adequate control over the
lending activities of their own branches.
Taken together, these developments suggest that the change in bank lending
behaviour was not entirely driven by adverse selection in the corporate finance
market. Banks seem to have deliberately selected higher risk borrowers and to have
monitored and screened them inappropriately (see, for example, Nakajima and
Taguchi 1995; Bank of Japan 1991b). This behavioural change seems to have been
a response to the compression of lending margins and the implied threat to the
franchise value of banking.28
3.3  Moral Hazards
Declining franchise values are probably not sufficient explanation for the more
adventurous approach of banks to lending: complementary considerations, such as
moral hazard are almost certainly necessary to explain the preference of banks for
riskier debt. The banking industry had, for most of its postwar history, been subject
to latent moral hazards, and while many of these hazards were not unique to Japan
in the 1980s, others were.
First consider the protection offered to shareholders in banks. Between the end of
the Pacific War and 1996, no bank had been allowed to fail. As an alternative to
formal liquidation, troubled financial institutions were merged – when necessary,
and subject to official oversight – with more stable banks, and often on terms that
respected the interests of shareholders in the troubled institution (Aoki et al 1994).
These arrangements were certainly not at the expense of bank profitability. As a
group, banks were much more profitable than industrial firms for most of the
postwar period (Calder 1993). At best, this made the banks vulnerable to
managerial slack; at worst, it may have encouraged individual bank managers to
seek out projects with a high-risk/high-return profile, when franchise values were
threatened.
There were also problems with the protection offered to the depositors of banks.
Between 1971 and 1996, deposit insurance premia were levied at a flat rate of
0.012 per cent of deposit liabilities. As Oda (1999) has pointed out, the
insensitivity of this pricing arrangement to the riskiness of portfolios may well
have encouraged banks to target lending sectors that had high risks attached to
them.
The behaviour of depositors themselves would have been an important aspect of
this problem. Although banks were increasingly targeting high risk borrowers and
monitoring their clients less effectively, households continued to use deposits as a
store of wealth (Table 1). Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) have argued that this may
have been because alternative instruments were inaccessible to households, in spite
of some financial deregulation. But a standard moral hazard story is a plausible
alternative to this view. Households continued to hold their savings as bank
deposits because they believed, with some justification, that those savings were29
subject to implicit guarantees. The attraction of this theory is that it helps to
explain why depositors drove up the rate of return on savings to the point at which
banks were compelled to target higher return, but riskier, borrowers. Without at
least the perception of implicit deposit insurance, depositors are unlikely to lend to
banks offering very high rates of return, since very high rates of return in a climate
of low lending rates would have been a signal of low asset quality.
A final, and rather peculiar, type of moral hazard involves non-bank lenders to
firms. When Japanese banks have the largest share of a firm’s bank debt, they
typically bear a very heavy responsibility as monitors of that firm. This monitoring
is not only conducted on behalf of all constituents of the firm, it is usually
integrated with respect to the borrower’s life-cycle: the bank monitors and screens
the activities of borrowers who are in good states, and in cases of the borrower’s
financial distress, it bears a disproportionately high share of the cost of workouts or
liquidation, often voluntarily subordinating its own claims to those of other
creditors in the process (Pascale and Rohlen 1983; Packer and Ryser 1992;
Horiuchi 1993; Suzuki and Wright 1985; Aoki 1990; Aoki et al 1994).12
Gower (1996) presents a model which reveals that this priority structure is subject
to a moral hazard which may lead to credit pricing that is inconsistent with proper
bank monitoring of borrowers. In the model, the bank is a price taker in both its
wholesale funds and lending markets, but it enjoys discretion over whether or not
to monitor any loans that it makes, on the understanding that, if the borrower
becomes financially distressed, it will subordinate its own claims to those of other
borrowers and organise costly workouts.
The bank competes in its lending markets with a perfectly competitive fringe of the
firm’s non-bank creditors.13 If the price set by the fringe is very low, then the
opportunity cost of borrower failure to the bank (that is, the interest rate on the
loan) is minimal, and the bank will not undertake the regular monitoring and
screening which is necessary to prevent that failure. The structure of claims against
the assets of a financially distressed borrower allows this to happen. Since the
                                          
12 The reasons for this, and some further references, are canvassed in Gower (1996, p 151).
13 The fringe prices according to the cost of wholesale funds, which is assumed to be set by the
monetary authority. In other words, monetary policy affects the real cost of wholesale funds,
and in that way influences credit pricing and the potency of moral hazard problems.30
claims of minor creditors to a firm are senior to those of the firm’s bank,
competitive minor creditors can generate credit prices which will mean that their
investments are not monitored. In doing this, they are pricing their seniority in
adverse states, and so are subject to a form of moral hazard. This may help to
explain why margins on some Japanese bank loans were reduced to the point at
which banks ceased to monitor and screen them effectively.
3.4  Other Regulatory Issues
Problems with the regulatory infrastructure also emerged during the 1980s. Some
features of bank supervision were less well-suited to the partly liberalised banking
market of the 1980s than to the regulated system for which they had been designed.
This facilitated certain lending practices which the authorities might not otherwise
have tolerated.
One problem was the inability of the authorities to exercise moral suasion over the
banks. Until the deregulation of the wholesale funds markets, banks accumulated
very large liabilities at the discount window and they were regularly instructed on
the appropriate uses of funds borrowed through this facility.14 However, this
instrument of monetary control became much weaker as a means of directing credit
flows once banks and their borrowers were given wider choice over their sources
of finance, and the practice of ‘administrative guidance’ in bank lending was
formally discontinued in 1991.
The emerging problems of bank monitoring may have been exacerbated by opaque
accounting practices. Only since the onset of widespread bad loans have Japanese
bank accounting practices approached internationally accepted standards. During
the 1980s, they were still relatively lax. To a certain extent, this is necessary in a
financial system where tax law and judicial process encourage financial institutions
to perform private workouts for financially distressed borrowers (Packer and
Ryser  1992). However, it has recently allowed banks to conceal their problem
loans and, in the 1980s, it allowed them to circumvent regulatory oversight. The
lending which took place to real estate-related ventures through non-bank financial
intermediaries is a good case in point.
                                          
14 Ito (1992) observes that, during the 1950s and 1960s, the borrowing of city banks at the
discount window exceeded their borrowing through the call market.31
A final problem was the regulation of non-bank financial intermediaries. Many of
the NBFIs to which the banks lent were beyond the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Finance. They either evaded financial regulation outright or were subject to a
system of financial regulation that was itself subject to demarcation problems.
4.  Summary
This paper has traced Japan’s current banking problems back to the displacement
of the banking system that occurred during the 1980s. It has argued that one key
cause of the problem was a trend deterioration in the average quality of borrowers,
as large firms experienced a reduced need for bank finance on account of their own
natural maturation and the greater accessibility of securities markets.
At the same time, banks became more adventurous in their lending. Their franchise
values had declined with their shifting customer base and the deregulation of the
wholesale funds markets. They responded with more aggressive loans promotion
and less attention to their monitoring and screening of borrowers.
Financial deregulation certainly influenced both processes. By the late 1970s, the
internationalisation and domestic liberalisation of Japan’s capital markets were
overdue. But the evidence presented in this paper highlights the difficulties that the
authorities experienced in insulating the banking system against the more harmful
effects of necessary reforms.
Macroeconomic policy, and monetary policy in particular, may also have
contributed to Japan’s banking problems. Although suited to inflationary and
exchange rate conditions of the time, monetary policy in the late 1980s was less
consistent with stability in the banking system. It contributed to an emerging
adverse selection problem in the lending market, and it compressed bank margins
in a way that encouraged the preference of banks for risky lending.32
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